Nigeria’s economy is in decline
following the downward trend in crude oil prices beginning in July 2014.
By the end of Q2 2016, the country slipped into recession, following
consecutive negative GDP growth in the first and second quarters of the
year. Low oil prices, exacerbated by militant attacks on oil and gas
facilities in the oil-producing Niger Delta region, a lack of competent
fiscal measures and adverse macroeconomic policies amongst other factors
have combined to make a bad case worse. Nigerians unanimously agree
that the country is faced with the urgent task to mitigate a growing
recession, and ultimately guide the economy back to growth; the strategy
to achieve this is the subject of diverse opinions.
The Nigerian Economic Council recently
recommended the sale of state-owned assets to raise much-needed
revenues. The Senate President, Bukola Saraki, and businessman Aliko
Dangote, have both supported this view. However, most wholly state-owned
assets have almost been run aground, making the literal interpretation
of the proposal a reasonable one. But wholly state-owned assets, like
the only three refineries in the country, a steel plant, amongst others,
which the country would benefit from privatising or even outright sale
are not the assets in focus.
The state-owned assets proposed for sale
are government-owned interests in joint venture assets with oil and gas
companies and the Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas, which are the primary
non-tax revenue generating assets for the country.
The begging question is: Should Nigerian shares in oil and gas assets be sold? We answer “Yes and No.”
“Yes, Sell”: The sale of several oil and
gas assets would benefit the Nigerian economy in the mid-long term. All
commercial assets in which the state has a controlling and operating
interest should be scaled down. These include assets held by the
Nigerian Petroleum Development Company, the exploration and production
subsidiary of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation. Competent and
efficient operations of several of those assets would lead to an
increase in production from the respective fields, which in turn would
translate to more national revenues. Many of these fields are currently
capped or under-producing.
National assets under the NNPC joint
venture arrangements with the IOCs should also be scaled down. The NNPC
owns 55 per cent of each JV with oil and gas companies holding the
remaining 45 per cent (there are slight variations). With these assets,
the NNPC reserves the right to become an operator, but a Joint Operating
Agreement is signed which sets the guidelines for running the
operations of the field, with one of the partners designated the
operator. All parties are required to share in the cost of operation.
Unfortunately, the NNPC is rarely able to meet its funding obligations,
and one wonders why in the first place anyone expected the NNPC to be
able to do so. This arrangement has also created a loophole for massive
graft and an inexplicable waste of government funds at the NNPC through
cash calls.
The economics of the JV assets would be
greatly enhanced if the state ownership were reduced well below the
statutory 55 per cent, to between 10 and 20 per cent depending on the
specific economic conditions of individual fields. The optimal operation
of these fields would provide requisite revenue through other means
including Petroleum Profit Tax, Equity Oil (without cash calls based on
10-20 per cent carry and cost recovery models), Royalty, etc. Any
strategy that optimises production from Nigerian fields would generate
more revenues for the Federal Government, better so if the NNPC is
removed from the equation.
Amongst Nigeria’s deep-water blocks,
there are a few with oil and gas discoveries but are considered
non-commercial for development under current economic terms. In a couple
of these fields, a reduction in the state’s statutory interest of 50
per cent held by the NNPC, has the potential to tip the economics of
scale towards commercial viability even under current oil prices.
Developing just two of these fields would add approximately 150,000
barrels per day of secure crude oil production within the next 4-5
years.
The capital and operating expenditure
required for the development of two of these fields exceed $10bn. While
the NNPC owns 50 per cent of these undeveloped blocks, it is unable to
contribute its share of 50 per cent of the required investment for
development. Developing these fields requires the investors or operators
to fund 100 per cent of the investment up to first oil, and depend on
long-term production cost recovery fiscal-terms, invariably condemning
these fields to non-commercial status.
In the cases mentioned above in
deep-water assets, the NNPC owns 50 per cent of the blocks that do not
generate income or economic activity. Thus, the economic benefit to the
state is zero. In these blocks, the NNPC divestment, applied along with
strategic incentives could lead to commercial viability. Development of
these fields would generate billions of dollars in economic activity for
local businesses, providing a multiplier effect and increase taxable
income from service providers. As long as the assets are operational,
there are several avenues for revenues to flow into government coffers
from these fields; these include Petroleum Tax, Equity Oil, and
Corporate Income Tax for all associated service providers to business
activities deriving from the operations of the fields.
As for state interests in pipeline
infrastructure, one wonders why the state retains these assets. Selling
these assets would free the state of scarce resources expended in
maintaining them. To optimise the benefit from relinquishing these
assets through sales, legislation would be required to make oil and gas
companies account for production at the wellhead rather than at export
terminals.
If oil and gas companies were made
accountable to pay Petroleum Tax, Equity Oil and Royalties on the volume
of oil produced at the wellhead, companies would be more responsible
towards eliminating pipeline breach and its accompanying oil theft. With
the availability of modern pipeline technology, it is curious that
Nigeria still grapples with crude oil theft from pipelines, a lot of
which is intertwined and explained away as part of the actions of
vandals and militant attacks.
“No Sale”: The country’s 49 per cent
interest in the Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas should not be
contemplated for sale. It is Nigeria’s single highest revenue generating
investment. A consortium of private oil and gas corporations owns
majority shares of the NLNG (51 per cent). They operate and make
management and investment decisions, making the NLNG a global model for
successful State/Public – Private partnership.
The reasons put forward by the
proponents for the sale of state-owned shares in the NLNG include the
need to raise capital for fiscal stimulus towards achieving the
implementation of the 2016 budget. In the first place, the proposed
objective is not tenable. Nigeria’s 49 per cent shares in the LNG cannot
be sold and successfully closed on, with and funds received in the bank
within the next 18 months.
In the case of the NLNG, due diligence,
process formulation, board and corporate resolutions/approvals, etc.,
would take more than a year, and this is just the process preceding a
formal approval of all shareholders for the commencement of divestment.
The estimated timeline does not take into account public opposition led
by unions and host communities against the sale of the asset.
The partners in the NLNG would also have
the right of first refusal on any proposed sale, and negotiations
between political interests and that of the Majority Private
Shareholders would raise legal issues that would take some time to
straighten out.
In the past five years, annual revenue
from the LNG to Nigeria has been between $1.5bn and $2.5bn. Applying a
simple valuation model, taking into account current market conditions
and an estimated potential growth of 25 per cent over the next ten
years, the present value of Nigeria’s interest in the LNG is between
$13.8bn and $23bn.
This amount cannot be banked in cash in a
sale transaction within one year, under current market conditions. In
consideration of political risk, an astute investor would spread out
payment at a highly discounted value for as long as possible,
considering a sale could be rescinded by future governments as was the
case with the sale of Nigerian state-owned refineries in 2007.
The NLNG is a great investment for
Nigeria; this benefit is not optimised because of the structure of the
NNPC, which holds the shares of the asset on behalf of Nigeria. Revenues
from Nigeria’s shares in the LNG have to pass through the NNPC, which
is wholly owned by the state, and the mismanagement of the dividends
occurs at this point. The NNPC has become more of a liability than an
asset to the country. Dealing with this and other related issues,
require legislation.
There is no justifiable long-term
benefit in selling Nigeria’s shares in the LNG, a quick sale as proposed
is not feasible.There is also no realistic path to raising funds for
Nigeria’s 2016 budget through oil and gas asset sales at the end of
2016; it is also unlikely that this can be achieved even for the 2017
budget.
For Nigeria’s shares in the NLNG, it is “no sale.”
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